INCONSISTENCIES IN STATE POLICY: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY, GOVERNANCE, AND INSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN
Avideh K. Mayville

Since its inception, Pakistan has endured endless political conflicts. Due to numerous factors, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been a breeding ground for insurgent movements, including fundamentalist Islamic movements such as al Qaeda and the Taliban. This paper asserts that there is a direct relationship between Pakistan’s institutional capacity and the rise of insurgent movements in the provinces bordering Afghanistan. In fact, institutional capacity is just one of several elements influencing the rise of insurgent groups. Other factors such as inconsistent state policy, ethnic tension, and government unwillingness to respond to local grievances are also main sources of insurgent support. Pakistan would benefit from more consistent policies aimed at (1) establishing a clear stance on religious extremist groups, (2) the development of basic infrastructure and (3) public service job training, in order to rival insurgent groups that currently provide these services.

Avideh Mayville will receive her Masters in International Peace and Conflict Resolution from the School of International Service at American University in May 2011. She graduated from St. Mary’s College of Maryland in 2009 with a degree in Political Economy of Development. Her primary interests are political theory, Middle East and Islamic studies.
INTRODUCTION

Conflict is a never ending part of the political landscape in Pakistan. All of its provinces are experiencing some form of prolonged dispute. Pakistan and India have been fighting over Kashmir since Pakistan’s inception. More recently, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the search for bin Laden has led to an international war on terror in which Pakistani land has become strategically important for military forces. Generally speaking, there has not been a period of relative peace in all of Pakistan’s history. This paper asserts that Pakistan’s institutional capacity and its capacity to govern are directly related to the ability of insurgent groups to challenge authority in the territories bordering Afghanistan in western Pakistan. These areas include the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Baluchistan.

The World Bank considers Pakistan’s governance structure unsatisfactory. The Bank’s evaluation of a country’s capacity to govern is based on several factors: voice and accountability, political stability, absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2009). A governance rating is developed between -2.5 and 2.5, with 2.5 being the best and -2.5 being the worst (WGI, 2009). On most counts, governance indicators for Pakistan were significantly better a decade ago than they are now (Mansoor, 2008). In 1997, Pakistan received a rating of 1.33 while in 2007 that rating had fallen to -2.44 (Gulf Times, 2008). In separate studies, the World Bank has found a positive correlation between governance and economic growth (Ibid). Given the trend over the past decade, Pakistan’s governance indicators do not suggest any promising economic growth (World Bank Pakistan Profile, 2010). This could be cause for concern given that the economically depressed have more incentive to join insurgent movements (Fearon, 2007). The inconsistencies in Pakistan’s government policies are a possible cause of the fall in Pakistan’s governance indicators. As Ishrat Husain states,

The elected governments, in their pursuit of winning the elections and the military governments in their attempts to gain legitimacy, get bogged down in ad-hoc and at times populist measures without addressing the root cause, i.e. the building of institutional capacity to deliver improved living standards for the majority of the population and setting up a viable governance superstructure. Personalized decision making according to the whims and caprices of individuals in power has displaced informed and well thought out institutionalized processes (Ishrat 2007).

Unfortunately, irresponsible short-term politics pervents long-term advancements. Most large-scale development projects require long-term commitments in order to reach completion. Successive regimes that abandon policies inherited from the past governments increase general public distrust of the government. For example, the government of President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani has been widely seen as inept and corrupt, making political appointments only “on the basis of cronyism, rather than genuine merits” (Sadruddin, 2009).

The effect of poor leadership, broken political promises and lack of improvements in the average Pakistani’s well-being has created a society that is frustrated with and distrustful of its government. For example, since 9/11, the government of Pakistan has been under international pressure to eliminate Islamist militant groups, especially in the regions that border Afghanistan.
where the Taliban and al Qaeda are operating. Pakistan’s military has battled Islamist militants, but there are still questions about how committed the government is to defeating them. Many of the peace agreements between the central government and militant groups have actually left insurgents in control of the disputed regions (Khan 2009). The Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which provided weapons and funding to anti-Soviet Islamist rebels in the 1980s, further exacerbates the ambiguity in the state’s policy towards extremists. The ISI is also widely believed to have helped conceive the alliance between pro-Taliban and pro-al Qaeda Islamic radicals during the October 2002 elections, which now control half the seats in the Pakistani senate (Mohan 2003). These actions, both on behalf of the central government and the ISI, have been inconsistent with the government’s official policy of preventing the spread of Islamic extremist groups in the border with Afghanistan – a policy which does not apply to Islamist insurgent groups in the Kashmiri region of Pakistan. These inconsistencies in policy have been detrimental to governance in Pakistan in terms of gaining legitimacy, which will be discussed later in the paper.

**GOVERNANCE: PAKISTANI-STYLE**

“The army is Pakistan’s only effective modern institution and the backbone of the Pakistani state.” (Lieven, 2002: 108)

Most observers view Pakistan as a military-led state. The military has exercised power even when civilian governments have been in office. Also, most of the country’s so-called ‘democratic’ leaders have remained dependent upon the army’s support and approval to stay in office (Alavi 2002: 31). The military periodically accuses elected leaders of compromising national security or corruption, and repeated military interventions in civilian politics have not allowed for any sort of civilian government to retain authority long enough to establish legitimacy (Haqqani 2004: 87). Instead of governing, Pakistan’s rulers have been “...reduced to managing ethnic, religious, and provincial tensions” (Ibid). In the absence of democratic decision-making, the Islamists have been able to dominate the political discourse resulting in the consistent dismantling of secular political parties by military governments (Haqqani 2004: 95). As a result, Pakistan’s military has been diverting a huge proportion of the country’s resources to support itself over the years (Lieven 2002: 112). With virtually no money left over for investment in infrastructure, Pakistan is unable to promote economic growth (Lieven 2002: 117).

The military is only one component of the wider “moderate oligarchy” that runs Pakistan. Membership in this moderate oligarchy requires “adherence to a common set of beliefs... that large-scale social reforms such as land redistribution are unacceptable, that the uneducated and illiterate masses deserve only contempt, that vociferous Muslim nationalism is desirable but true Islamism is not, and that Washington is to be despised but fully taken advantage of” (Hoodbhoy 2004: 125). This perception of the government has fueled the ability of insurgent groups to garner local support. To a large extent, even the so-called democracies in Pakistan have been supported by the military. The problem with this is that the role of a military in any society is not necessarily one of building peace, unity and cohesion, but of maintaining order. Since there has never been a democracy in Pakistan stable enough to last without military intervention, major decisions regarding how the central government deals with insurgent groups in conflict areas are mainly made by the military. However, while the army is strong enough to prevent state failure,
it is not the force by which major changes will be made. Instead of using money to invest in infrastructure, such as building schools, hospitals and shelters, the government of Pakistan has been spending hundreds of millions of dollars -- approximately 30 percent of its national budget and 5 percent of its GDP (Haqqani 2004: 86) -- on defense and weapons (Stern 2000: 125).

Indeed, some of this funding is necessary. Over half of the estimated 20 million small arms in Pakistan is illegally owned (IRIN UN-OCHA 2007). Small arms are widely available along the border of Afghanistan. Due to fighting between pro-Taliban extremists and government forces, many arms, including weapons such as missiles, rockets and automatic machine guns, have been proliferating rapidly in Bannu, which is located in the NWFP (Ibid). The highest number of weapons, as reported by police, is located within the NWFP (Ibid). While 30 percent of the budget is allotted toward military weapons, this does not address the problem in the NWFP. An initiative endorsed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) suggested establishing Model Reform Zones (MRZs) in tribal areas in order to promote governance. Such MRZs are designed to increase judicial access, promote institutional development, increase security presence and enact other various programs to promote state legitimacy (White 2008: 8), which is seriously lacking in tribal areas. While tough military crackdowns of violent rebellions are necessary in the short run, the FATA and the NWFP represent a more long-term challenge that ultimately “will only be solved by massive rural development and education programs” (Johnson 2008: 76).

Yet, in the NWFP, police in eleven districts do not even have enough vehicles to patrol their respective areas, and 86 would-be police stations do not have proper buildings to serve as headquarters (Associated Press of Pakistan, 2009). This problem is not limited to the NWFP. In the FATA, 180 police personnel deaths from fighting militant Islamist insurgent groups in 2009 could have been prevented with better protection gear and equipment (Ibid). The current police chief of the NWFP has requested an increase in the capacity building of his force to battle the ‘growing cancer’ of Talibanization (Ibid). The former police chief of the NWFP, Malik Naveed Khan, has said that better training, modern equipment and the induction of new technology could help the NWFP police force combat insurgent groups (Ibid).

Pakistan’s weak court system is another part of the problem. As a result of the inability of Pakistani courts to handle the many cases that arise, there has been a rise in the establishment of more religious Shari’a courts. In the Swat region of the NWFP, locals have demanded Shari’a courts because they dispense “inexpensive and speedy justice” (Siddique 2008). Swat is one of the many places in the NWFP where neo-Taliban organizations are operating and garnering local support as a result of their active response to local grievances (White 2009) – such as with the establishment of Shari’a courts. The pursuit of justice in Pakistani civil and military courts is an inconvenient, expensive and time-consuming process that is largely unorganized and insensitive to the needs of the people, thus encouraging the rise of the quick and effective Shari’a court system (Javaid 2009).

In addition to security issues and an ineffective modern justice system, the lack of a strong education system in western Pakistan is also a cause of the rising influence of insurgency groups. Studies show that ethnic minorities, such as the Baluchis living in Baluchistan (Dawn News 2009) and those that live in rural areas, such as the mountainous and desert areas of Pakistan’s western frontier, have the lowest literacy and school attendance rates (Munir 2006).
Many rural areas do not have enough public schools to accommodate the needs of its population (Ibid). If properly funded and developed, these schools would produce employable individuals who would be less of a burden on the state. The hope is that public schools would produce individuals who will be less likely to turn toward extremist insurgent groups and more likely to contribute to the economic development of their regions.

In contrast to the lack of Pakistani schools in the rural west, Islamic religious schools – madrassahs – are located all over the country and provide free education, food, housing and clothing (Ibid). The madrassah system was established during the Afghan-Soviet war, when the CIA spent funds to buy advertisements to draw in ideologically dedicated men to fight in Afghanistan (Hoodbhoy 2004). During this same period of time, a $50 million USAID grant paid for textbooks that exhorted Afghan children to “pluck out the eyes of their enemies and cut off their legs” (Ibid). These books were approved by the Taliban for use in madrassahs and are still widely available in both Afghanistan and Pakistan (Ibid).

Under General Zia ul-Haq in the 1980s, many madrassahs were funded by the Islamic tax collected by the state (zikat). With this funding, the government had some control over the madrassahs, but now most madrassahs are funded by private backers and operate without state supervision. Most madrassahs offer only religious instruction and ignore secular subjects such as math and science (Stern 2000). These schools encourage their unemployed graduates, who cannot find work because of their lack of a practical education, to fight against Hindus in Kashmir or against Muslims in other parts of Pakistan (Ibid). An estimated 10 percent to 15 percent of madrassahs produce this type of student (Ibid).

The inability of the central government to provide reliable security, justice and education has resulted in the creation of makeshift justice systems under the control of insurgent groups that have the capacity to provide for the local populations. The implications this has for the future of the Pakistani state should not be taken lightly, given that the country’s border regions with Afghanistan harbor extremist groups that pose threats to the broader world community. The reasons for this are not merely due to state failure on the part of the Pakistani government, but also a result of other factors including ethnic divisions and rivalries.

**ETHNIC HISTORY OF THE NWFP, THE FATA, AND BALUCHISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON INSURGENCY**

The three regions that border Afghanistan are the NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan. In 1893, a border was drawn between Afghanistan and what was formerly India (present-day Pakistan) known as the Durand line (Balkhi 2007). After the partitioning of Pakistan, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan was never formally agreed upon, but it is nonetheless upheld internationally (Ibid). This border creates a division between Pashtun and Baluchi ethnic populations in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ibid). A formal border between the two countries, not including several recognized and patrolled border crossings, is not officially charted or recognized.

In order to understand the reasons behind the perpetual conflict in the provinces of western Pakistan, it is important to recognize the history of the western border regions. First, it is vital to note that the western part of Pakistan that borders Afghanistan is home to some of the
roughest terrain in the world. Geologists have claimed that Baluchistan is the region on earth that most resembles Mars due to its rugged mountains and deserts (Surendra 2009: 256). This makes effective governance and unification of different tribal groups a great challenge. According to Pakistani officials, there are two established border crossings that handle the bulk of daily cross-border traffic, as well as another twenty border-crossing routes that are manned by customs officials (Johnson, Mason 2008: 44). However, there are also 340 “unfrequented” (meaning illegal and known) and unmanned border crossings between the two countries (Ibid). In addition, there are hundreds of foot and goat paths that are not recognized by either Pakistan or Afghanistan and are largely known only to those who traverse them (Ibid). Because the border regions are predominantly rural tribal territories, it is difficult for the Pakistani central government to hold authority, even when making deals with militants or attempting to suppress populations through armed action (IRIN UN-OCHA 2007). When the terrain is favorable to rebel groups, government forces including the military are disadvantaged (Collier, Hoeffler 2004: 5).

In addition to the harsh terrain, many of the tribes that reside on the western border of Pakistan have been there for over a thousand years. These tribal governing systems were already in place when Pakistan was partitioned. For the most part, Pakistan’s struggle with building institutional capacity in the western provinces has largely been an attempt to unify communities that have existed happily and independently since before the partitioning of Pakistan. They have no real reason to be loyal to the central government of a country that was established in the past century.

The dominance of Punjabis in Pakistani politics further exacerbates the border split of these two large ethnic groups. Punjabis account for 63 percent of Pakistan’s population and constitute an even higher proportion of the army, officer corps and administrative elite (Lieven 2002: 107). As a result of Punjabi domination of the army, military rule increases discontent in the provinces where the Punjab are not a majority, i.e. the NWFP, the FATA, and Baluchistan (Lieven 2002: 111). The two ethnic groups with very strong cultural heritages that conflict with Punjabi attempts to rule are the Baluchi, who live in Baluchistan, and the Pashtuns, who are predominantly in the FATA and the NWFP but also live in northern Baluchistan (See Figure 1 in the Appendix).

**Baluchi**

The Baluchi are one of the few groups whose stubborn and unrelenting insurgency against the government is not religion-based. Prior to the partitioning of Pakistan, the Baluchi tribes recognized chiefs, called *sardars*, who held leadership positions. Sardar positions are hereditary; however, if a sardar does not consistently demonstrate wisdom, strength and justice in his rule, then he must forfeit his position (Johnson, Mason 2008: 48-9). During colonial times, the British did not challenge sardari culture. The British way of dealing with the sardars became known as the Sandeman system. Historian David Gilmour said,

The Sandeman system seemed simple. You made friends with the tribes, you dealt with them through their chiefs, you paid tribesmen to patrol your communications, you adhered to tribal custom and settled disputes by jirgas and not through law courts. You tried to solve all problems peacefully but you kept an effective military force ready and visible; and from time to time you extended your control by the construction of roads and forts. (Johnson, Mason 2008: 49).
As a result, the Baluchi did not have conflicts with imperial Britain. However, the sardari system of authority has been challenged in recent years by the Pakistani government. Following the Baluchi revolt in 1973, shortly after the discovery of major natural gas and mineral reserves underneath Baluchi land, the central government of Pakistan revoked the authority of the sardars to administer their own people, moved in, and took control of their lands (Ibid). A number of important gas lines that are responsible for supplying gas to all of Pakistan originate in Baluchistan, and the Baluchi people receive practically no compensation from the wealth acquired by the lines; thus, the gas pipelines are popular targets for Baluchi rebels (Surendra 2009: 250). Imran Khan, a member of Pakistan’s parliament, complained that Islamabad “has treated Baluchistan like a colony.” The relationship between the Pakistani government and the Baluchi is to some extent the result of ethnic tension between the Baluchis and the ruling Punjab elite. Baluchi nationalist Humayun Baluch has said that Punjabis are being introduced as settlers, traders and miners, and that “our provincial resources are being exploited and looted. People’s rights are being compromised and everything is being done for the benefit of the Punjabis (IRIN UN-OCHA 2009).” The Baluchis have led four insurgencies in 1948, 1958, 1962, and 1973-1977, which were successfully suppressed by the Pakistani army.

Baluch insurgencies have generally been the product of several factors: (1) Baluchi national pride that rejects outside interference; (2) the legacy of British policy that enabled Baluchi autonomy; (3) mismanagement by ruling Pakistani regimes; and (4) a list of grievances that cemented and mobilized Baluchi nationalists (Ibid). Governing Baluchistan has proved to be one of the Pakistani central government’s biggest issues. The goals of the Baluch insurgency include greater autonomy, reinstatement of the Baluchis’ tribal land rights, reinstatement of the authority of the sardars and an equitable distribution of resources to the Baluchi people (Johnson, Mason 2008: 50).

Meanwhile, few of Pakistan’s rural development projects that are funded with revenues from the Baluch natural resources have reached the Baluchi people (Ibid). Of all the government employees in Baluchistan, 90 percent are non-Baluchis, thus heightening resentment of the central government among the Baluchi (Surendra, 2009: 250). Also, the Baluchi are largely absent from government-sponsored projects in Baluchistan. The Gwadar Port was constructed without any consultation from the Baluchi, no contracts were awarded to Baluchi companies, and none of the 57 senior managers employed by the government was Baluch (Ibid). When the port was inaugurated, the President announced his pledge of government funding for education, health, sewage programs and a “Marine College” to be built in the port city for the Baluchi people, but no one believed him (Ibid).¹ In contrast to Pakistan’s policy toward the Taliban, the Pakistani government has pursued a course of massive military suppression of the Baluchi insurgency since the uprising in 1973, when they forced control of Baluchi resources (Ibid). In response to Baluchi separatists, former president Musharraf went on record as saying, “Don’t push us. This isn’t the 1970s when you can hit and run and hide in the mountains. This time you won’t even know what hit you” (Surendra 2009: 251).

Pashtun

The Pashtuns are located in northern Baluchistan, the FATA and the NWFP. The Pashtuns follow a societal code known as Pashtunwali. Pashtunwali is the sum total of the various Pashtun tribes’ collective expectations of their members to conform to norms and
customs in order to ensure group survival (Glatzer 1998). Pashtunwali encompasses four central personal values: freedom, honor, revenge and chivalry (Ibid). Unlike the Baluchs, who invest their tribal sardars with many of the leadership powers of a traditional tribal chief, “any sort of external direction is not merely abhorrent to Pashtuns, but lies beyond their mental compass” (Ibid). Out of the many people and cultures along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the Pashtun people have been particularly susceptible to extremist religious movements. The Pashtun people have therefore resisted any imposition of external governance because of their “inherently conservative society that yields to religious zealotry whenever weakened from the inside or pressured excessively from the outside, precisely because of its lack of unitary leadership and the unbending nature of its compulsory social code, Pashtunwali” (Johnson, Mason 2008: 73). Part of the reason why extremists have been able to find a safe haven in Pashtun land is because many of the insurgents are Pashtun themselves and understand and respect the culture, unlike the central government of Pakistan.

Consequently, the Taliban and al Qaeda militants are using Pashtun lands for operations and as a training ground for future militants (Johnson, Mason 2008: 57). It has been reported by Western officials that al-Qaeda now uses North Waziristan, which is located in the FATA, as an operations and training base (Jakarta Post, 2009). Also, since 2001, the Taliban has been targeting Waziri tribal leaders through intimidation and assassinations. More than 200 tribal elders that resisted the Taliban were reported murdered by Taliban agents in the FATA each year in 2005 and 2006 (Johnson, Mason 2008: 57). This example illustrates the extent of Taliban power in parts of the FATA. Other lesser known militant groups also operate from Pashtun lands, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb party, which received funding from the CIA through Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the Afghan-Soviet war and purportedly has ties to bin Laden and al Qaeda (Bergen 2001: 73).

The insurgency situations in Baluchistan, the NWFP and the FATA can largely be attributed to two factors: (1) the ambivalence of the Pakistani central government’s commitment to progress and development in its western frontiers; and (2) lack of respect for and understanding of tribal authority, which in the case of the Pashtuns can largely explain the rise of Islamist militant groups. These factors are exacerbated by the ethnic tension that is heightened by Punjab domination of the Pakistani central government. The situation in the western provinces is far worse than in the eastern Punjab-dominated provinces. They have a higher mortality rate and fewer medical resources (World Health Organization 2010), although some of this is related to the challenging terrain of the area presenting an obvious obstacle to infrastructure development. Female literacy rates in the western provinces are around half that of young girls in the eastern provinces, hovering around 22 percent (Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement 2007).

**Conclusion**

Lack of government capacity is only one of the reasons why Islamic groups have been able to take control of conflict areas. However, to some extent these conflict areas have had authority disputes since before the partitioning of Pakistan. Pakistan’s government does not have the capacity to govern parts of the NWFP, the FATA and Baluchistan, especially given that prior to the establishment of Pakistan, local and tribal leaders largely governed these areas. The establishment of Pakistan presented a conflict to the groups already existing in the areas that
happened to become part of Pakistan during the partitioning. Thus, this history of conflict in the NWFP, the FATA and Baluchistan can be attributed to the Pakistani central government’s attempt to establish and assert authority over regions it had not previously governed.

The Pakistani case shows that the mobilizing influence of tribal networks is absolutely necessary for institutional inclusion at the local level (Surendra 2009: 246). This paper explored the relationship between state capacity and the existence of insurgent groups in the provinces bordering Afghanistan in western Pakistan. However, the issue of the Pakistani government’s capacity is intertwined with multifarious issues. Specifically, the inconsistencies in Pakistan’s policies towards militant Islamist groups have largely been exacerbated by the country’s political ties with the United States. In contrast, the Baluchi insurgency has been a clear result of the central government’s abuse of their natural resources, lack of respect for local tribal authority and the central government’s lack of commitment toward pursuing projects that would benefit the Baluchi people.

In addition, existing ethnic tensions have increased due to the central government’s inability to deal with grievances, many of which involve lack of institutional development without military force. In an attempt to unify a state that has been fragmented on many levels of society since its inception, Pakistani governments have embraced a pan-Islamism that seems to be the only unifying factor in a very diverse state. However, in doing so, the government has quietly supported extremist groups, such as the Taliban, in order to control conflict areas that the government does not have the capacity to govern. Instead of responding to grievances on its western border regions such as addressing economic grievances by building schools, hospitals and including ethnic groups into local and national governments, Pakistani government officials have resorted to force in attempt to control these areas.

In the end, Pakistan’s incapacity to govern its border provinces in the west is one of many factors that have contributed to the rise of insurgent groups. Inconsistent policies, ethnic tension and the central government’s unwillingness to respond to local grievances are the main causes of the rise of groups that include the Taliban and al Qaeda. Pakistan would benefit from more consistent policies that develop basic infrastructure while providing training for teachers and police officers, in order to decrease the reliance on the insurgent groups that currently provide these services. The government should not ostracize local leaders, but include them in the political process. If successfully implemented, such policies would mitigate the influence of the Baluchi insurgency and undermine the ability of other Islamist groups to garner support in the Pashtun tribal areas. The Government of Pakistan has maintained an ambiguous policy towards Islamist extremists, yet it is aggressively fighting the non-Islamist Baluchi insurgents. In effect, Pakistan’s state policy has hindered effective institutional growth that would have otherwise prevented the rise of insurgency. Pakistan’s generally ambiguous policy toward religious extremists suggests that the central government views Islamic identity as the only hope for uniting its fragmented country. Such policies neglect the government’s weak social infrastructure and refuse to work with ethnic minorities. The Government of Pakistan needs to focus less on conformity to state ideology and the unification of its disparate ethnic minorities, and focus more on the cause of conflicts. If the Pakistani central government wants to reduce instances of conflict and insurgency, it must re-evaluate the major thrust of its policy and the subsequent effects on the political stability and development of the country.
References


Surendra, Shanna Dietz. “Explaining Social Mobilization in Pakistan.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29, no. 2 (2009)


Appendix

Figure 1

Map of Pakistan showing major ethnic groups.
Figure 2
Figure 3
ENDNOTES

1 Available reports on the building of a Marine College in the port city only mention the inauguration plans and indicate that it is unclear whether or not the college has actually been built.

   [http://www.pakistanpaedia.com/maps/map_pakistan_ethnic_groups.gif](http://www.pakistanpaedia.com/maps/map_pakistan_ethnic_groups.gif)


   [http://www.uspolicyinabigworld.com/_photos/Pakistan_provincial_map.jpg](http://www.uspolicyinabigworld.com/_photos/Pakistan_provincial_map.jpg)